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TAKING REMEDIAL MEASURES TO AMEND MARYLAND RULE 
OF EVIDENCE 5-407 TO EXPLICITLY APPLY TO PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY ACTIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Assume that the defendant is a mass producer of automobile seat 
belts. The plaintiff claims that she suffered injury as a result of the 
seat belt's design defect and wishes to introduce evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures taken by the defendant to change the belt's 
design. 1 If this were a negligence suit, most jurisdictions would unani-
mously agree that such evidence is inadmissible. 2 However, in a prod-
ucts liability action, admissibility of the evidence depends upon in 
which jurisdiction the suit is filed. 3 
In 1997, Federal Rule of Evidence 407 was amended, explicitly ex-
tending the exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures to 
products liability actions. 4 The amended rule provides that evidence 
1. Subsequent remedial measures include procedural changes, changes in 
material or personnel, repairs, and "other precautionary actions made after 
an event." Wilson v. Morris, 317 Md. 284, 297, 563 A.2d 392, 398 (1989). 
2. See, e.g., Jennings v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 143, 148-49 (D. Md. 1962) 
(stating that defendant's deepening of a drainage ditch after an automo-
bile accident allegedly caused by poor drainage was inadmissible to prove 
negligence); City of Miami Beach v. Wolfe, 83 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. 1955) 
(holding evidence of repairs to a hole in the sidewalk after plaintiff was 
injured were inadmissible to demonstrate negligence); Tuer v. McDonald, 
347 Md. 507, 532, 701 A.2d llOl, lll3 (1997) (holding evidence of a 
change in hospital protocol after the death of a patient inadmissible to 
prove negligence); Badges v. N.Y. Rapid Transit Corp., 18 N.Y.S.2d 304, 
305-06 (1940) (holding that the trial court in a negligence action improp-
erly admitted evidence that defendant repaired a stairway after plaintiff's 
accident therein). But see Porchia v. Design Equip. Co., 113 F.3d 877, 880 
(8th Cir. 1997) (stating that the law of the eighth circuit does not mandate 
the exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in products lia-
bility cases); Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322 (lOth 
Cir. 1983) (holding that Rule 407 does not extend to products liability 
actions). 
3. Evidence of the seat belt design change, a subsequent remedial measure, in 
a products liability claim would be inadmissible in all federal courts. See 
infra notes 4-6 and accompanying text. However, state courts are divided 
on whether to apply Rule 407 to products liability actions. See infra notes 7-
8 and accompanying text. 
4. FED. R. Evm. 407. The amended rule reads: 
When, after an injury or harm allegedly is caused by an event, mea-
sures are taken that, if taken previously, would have made the in-
jury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent 
measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, 
a defect in a product, a defect in a product's design, or a need for a warning 
or instruction. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence 
137 
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of subsequent remedial measures may not be used to prove a product 
or design defect or to prove that the product should have been ac-
companied by an instruction or warning.5 The amendment adopted 
the view of a majority of the federal circuits.6 
Although the amendment clarified application of the exclusionary 
rule at the federal level, state courts remain divided on the issue. 7 
Many states refuse to exclude evidence of subsequent remedial mea-
sures in products liability actions.8 Maryland's current rule, 5-407, 
of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as 
proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary mea-
sures, if controverted, or impeachment. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
5. !d.; Forma Scientific, Inc. v. BioSera, Inc., 960 P.2d 108, 112-13 (Colo. 
1998) (discussing the amendment to Federal Rule 407); Duchess v. Lang-
ston Corp., 769 A.2d 1131, 1137-38 (Pa. 2001) (stating the language of Fed-
eral Rule 407 and comparing it to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 407). 
6. See, e.g., Wood v. Morbark Indus., Inc., 70 F.3d 1201, 1209 (11th Cir.1995) 
(holding that the trial court properly excluded evidence of a design change 
because Rule 407 applies to products liability claims); Joint E. Dist. & S. 
Dist. Asbestos Litig. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 995 F.2d 343, 345 (2d 
Cir. 1993) (acknowledging that Rule 407 applies in all products liability 
actions); Raymond v. Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1525 (1st Cir. 1991) 
(holding that evidence of repairs made by the defendant six years after the 
manufacture of the product were inadmissible in the products liability ac-
tion); Guathier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 637 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding 
inadmissible under Rule 407 evidence of subsequent design changes in a 
products liability action); Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469-
70 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that Rule 407 required exclusion of subsequent 
remedial measures in products liability actions); Grenada Steel Indus., Inc. 
v. Ala. Oxygen Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 883, 888 (5th Cir. 1983) (opining that 
post-accident design changes were properly excluded because Rule 407 ap-
plies to products liability claims);Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 990 
(3d Cir. 1982) (stating that Federal Rule 407 applies to products liability 
actions); Werner v. Upjohn, Inc., 628 F.2d 848, 856-57 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 1080 (1981) (holding that the policy behind Rule 407 is 
best served by extending its application to products liability actions); 
Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230, 232 (6th Cir. 
1980) (holding that the District Court's admission of evidence of a design 
change violated Federal Rule 407); Dine v. W. Exterminating Co., No. 
CIV.A.86-1857-0G, 1988 WL 28241, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 16, 1988) (holding 
that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is inadmissible in a prod-
ucts liability claim). But see Porchia v. Design Equip. Co., 113 F.3d 877, 880 
(8th Cir. 1997) (stating that the law of the Eighth Circuit does not mandate 
the exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in products lia-
bility cases); Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 716 F.2d 1322 (lOth 
Cir. 1983) (holding that Rule 407 does not extend to products liability 
actions). 
7. See infra note 8. 
8. See, e.g., Kv. R. Evm. 407 (2001) (acknowledging Rule 407's inapplicability 
to products liability actions); TEx. R. Evm. 407 (2001) (stating that 
"[n]othing in this rule shall preclude admissibility in products liability cases 
based on strict liability"); Schelbauer v. Butler Mfg. Co., 673 P.2d 743, 754 
(Cal. 1984) (holding that a judge has discretion to admit evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures in a products liability case); Caldwell v. Yamaha 
Motor Co., 648 P.2d 519, 523 (Wyo. 1982) (stating that the provisions of 
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does not explicitly state whether it applies to products liability ac-
tions,9 opting to leave the issue to development through the case 
law. 10 Although the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland in Troja v. 
Black & Decker Manufacturing Co. 11 held that Rule 5-407 applies to 
products liability actions, 12 an amendment to 5-407 codifying this 
holding, and expanding upon it, is necessary. 
This Comment examines the admissibility of evidence of subse-
quent remedial measures in products liability actions in Maryland. 
Part II provides background information regarding the application of 
Rule 407 to negligence actions. 13 Part II also clarifies the distinctions 
between negligence actions and those actions based in strict liability. 14 
In Part III, this Comment explores federal and state courts' reasoning 
for deciding whether or not to apply the exclusionary rule to products 
liability actions. 15 Part III also analyzes the 1997 amendment to the 
federal rule. 16 Part IV examines the development of Rule 5-407 in 
Maryland law, including the Maryland Evidence Committee's 1993 
recommendation to the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 17 Finally, in 
Part V, the author will propose how Maryland should amend its cur-
rent rule to explicitly apply to products liability actions. 18 
Wyoming Rule of Evidence 407 are inapplicable to strict liability concepts). 
But see Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 62 Md. App. 101, 114, 488 A.2d 
516, 522 (1985) (holding that Maryland Rule 5-407 applies to products lia-
bility actions); Dixon v. Jacobsen Mfg. Co., 637 A.2d 915, 924 (NJ. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1994) (stating that New Jersey Rule of Evidence 407 is applica-
ble to products liability, as well as negligence); Duchess v. Langston Corp., 
769 A.2d 1131, 1145 (Pa. 2001) (holding that Pennsylvania Rule of Evi-
dence 407 precludes use of a "subsequent design change as substantive evi-
dence of a product defect"). 
9. Mo. R. Evm. 5-407. Rule 5-407 states: 
!d. 
(a) In general. When, after an event, measures are taken which, if 
in effect at the time of the event, would have made the event less 
likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent measures is not admissi-
ble to prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the 
event. 
(b) Admissibility for Other Purposes. This Rule does not require 
the exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for 
another purpose, such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility 
of precautionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment. 
10. LYNN McLAIN, MARYLAND PRACTICE: MARYLAND RULES OF EviDENCE§ 2.407.4 
(1994). Although the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland has applied 
the common law exclusionary rule to products liability cases, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland refused to approve a codification of the rule. /d. 
11. 62 Md. App. 101, 488 A.2d 516, cert. denied, 303 Md. 471 (1985). 
12. Id. at 114, 488 A.2d at 522. 
13. See infra notes 22-56 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra notes 57-69 and accompanying text. 
15. See infra notes 70-89 and accompanying text. 
16. See infra notes 90-93 and accompanying text. 
17. See infra Part IV. 
18. See discussion infra Part V. 
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II. EVOLUTION OF RULE 5-407 
In order to adequately discuss extending Rule 5-407 to explicitly 
include products liability actions, one must first have a clear under-
standing of the rule's application to negligence suits. This section 
first traces the rule's common law origins and its codification at the 
federallevel, 19 then examines the rationale behind Rule 407.20 Mter 
this foundation is laid, this section will identify the similarities and 
differences between negligence and products liability actions. 21 
A. Negligence and Rule 407 
1. Common Law Origins 
The general rule of excluding evidence of subsequent remedial 
measures originated in the common law. 22 English courts adopted 
the doctrine in 1869, and soon thereafter American courts embraced 
the practice of excluding evidence of subsequent remedial mea-
sures. 23 Recognizing that the majority of state courts had adopted an 
exclusionary rule barring admission of evidence of subsequent reme-
dial measures, the United States Supreme Court adopted the same 
rule in Columbia & Puget Sound Railroad v. Hawthorne. 24 The Court's 
rationale relied upon the reasoning provided by the Supreme Court 
of Minnesota in Morse v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway Co.25 The 
Morse court had asserted that evidence of subsequent remedial mea-
19. See infra notes 22-39 and accompanying text. 
20. See discussion infra Part II.A.3. 
21. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
22. Michael W. Blanton, Comment, Application of Federal Rule of Evidence 407 in 
Strict Products Liability Cases: The Evidence Weighs Against Automatic Exclusion, 
65 UMKC L. REv. 49, 53-55 (1996) (discussing the common law doctrine of 
excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures in negligence 
actions). 
23. !d. at 53 (noting that "[t]he common law doctrine excluding evidence of 
subsequent remedial measures is of 'relatively recent origin"').(check 
quote to see where it ends). 
24. 144 U.S. 202 (1892). In Columbia, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant 
sawmill owner negligently provided him with a defective machine that 
caused his injuries. !d. at 202. At trial, the plaintiff introduced evidence 
that after his accident, the defendant made alterations in the sawmill ma-
chinery. !d. at 206. 
25. 16 N.W. 358 (Minn. 1883) (holding that evidence of defendant's post-acci-
dent repair of an allegedly defective railroad switch is inadmissible to prove 
the defendant's negligence). In Morse, plaintiff alleged that plaintiff's intes-
tate was fatally wounded due to defendant's alleged failure to maintain its 
railroad track. !d. at 358. The defects of the track, including an imperfect 
switch, allegedly caused the engine to be thrown off the track, thereby kill-
ing the plaintiff, who was on board the engine. Id. At trial, plaintiff intro-
duced evidence that subsequent to the fatal accident, defendant repaired 
the allegedly defective switch. !d. at 359. On appeal, the Supreme Court of 
Minnesota held that admission of such evidence was error. !d. 
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sures "afford[s] no legitimate basis for construing such an act as an 
admission of previous neglect of duty."26 
The Morse court also noted that a person who abides by the law in 
exercising necessary care may adopt extra safeguards after an accident 
occurs in order to prevent future accidents.27 The court opined that 
it would be unjust to then punish that person by construing those 
additional safeguards as admissions of prior negligence.28 Both the 
Morse court and the United States Supreme Court in Columbia empha-
sized the rule's application to negligence actions.29 
2. Codification of the Federal Rule 
Rule 308 of the Model Code of Evidence provided initial recogni-
tion, outside of common law, of the inadmissibility of evidence of re-
medial measures.30 Soon thereafter, the Uniform Rule of Evidence 51 
expressed another version of the remedial measures rule. 31 This ver-
sion, however, added that evidence of subsequent remedial conduct 
was inadmissible only when offered "to prove negligence or culpable 
conduct. "32 
In 1969, a preliminary draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence in-
cluded Rule 407.33 This version, based upon both Uniform Rule 51 
26. /d. at 359. 
27. Morse v. Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co., 16 N.W. 358, 359 (Minn. 1883). 
28. /d. (stating "[t]he more careful a person is, the more regard he has for the 
lives of others, the more likely he would be to [take remedial measures], 
and it would seem unjust that he could not do so without being liable to 
have such acts construed as an admission of prior negligence"). 
29. See Columbia, 144 U.S. at 207; Morse, 16 N.W. at 359. 
30. Blanton, supra note 22, at 55. The Model Code was an "official catalog of 
the common law rules of evidence," composed in the 1940s by the Ameri-
can Law Institute. Marcie J. Freeman, Comment, Spanning the Spectrum: Pro-
posed Amendments to Federal Rule of Evidence 407, 28 TEx. TECH L. REv. 1175, 
1179 (1997). Model Code Rule 308 states: 
Evidence of the taking of a precaution by a person to prevent the 
repetition of a previous harm or the occurrence of a similar harm 
or evidence of the adoption of a plan requiring that such a precau-
tion be taken is inadmissible as tending to prove that his failure to 
take such a precaution to prevent the previous harm was negligent. 
MoDEL CoDE OF Evm. R. 308 (1942). 
31. See Freeman, supra note 30, at 1179. The Uniform Rules were a collabora-
tion between the American Bar Association and the Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws. /d. Uniform Rule 51 reads: 
"Subsequent Remedial Conduct. When after the occurrence of an 
event remedial or precautionary measures are taken, which, if 
taken previously would have tended to make the event less likely to 
occur, evidence of such subsequent measures is not admissible to 
prove negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the 
event." 
BuRR W. JoNES, THE LAw OF EviDENCE CIVlL AND CruMINAL app. 4, at 1933 
(5th ed. 1958) (quoting UNIF. R. Evm. 51). 
32. Jones, supra note 31, app. 4, at 1933 (emphasis added). 
33. Blanton, supra note 22, at 56. 
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and a section of the proposed Missouri Evidence Code, 34 added ex-
ceptions to the exclusionary rule.35 These exceptions allowed admis-
sion of remedial conduct evidence when offered for purposes such as 
proving control, ownership, or feasibility of controverted precaution-
ary measures, and impeachment.36 Mter slight changes to the draft 
were made, the United States Supreme Court and Congress enacted 
Rule 407 in 1975.37 Thus, prior to the addition of the 1997 strict lia-
bility amendment,38 Rule 407 provided: 
When, after an event, measures are taken which, if taken pre-
viously, would have made the event less likely to occur, evi-
dence of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove 
negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the 
event. This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence 
of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, 
such as proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precau-
tionary measures, if controverted, or impeachment.3 
3. Rationale Behind the Rule 
There are three main aspects to the rationale behind the rule gen-
erally excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures.4° First, 
the probative value of such evidence is low with regard to negligence 
or culpability.41 Second, policy reasons of encouraging people to take 
subsequent remedial measures support applying the exclusionary 
rule.42 Finally, the exclusionary rule helps eliminate the likelihood of 
jury confusion and unfair prejudice that may arise with the admission 











Id. at 55-56 (discussing the evolution of Rule 407). 
Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evid. for the U.S. District Courts 
and Magistrates, Rule 407, 46 F.R.D. 161, 236 (1969). 
!d. 
Blanton, supra note 22, at 56. 
See infra Part III.C. 
Rules of Evid. for the United States Courts and Magistrates, Rule 407, 56 
F.R.D. 183, 225 (1973). One scholar noted three significant differences in 
the statutory codification and its common law heritage. Blanton, supra note 
22, at 56-57. First, Rule 407 broadened the definition of evidence that the 
rule would affect. !d. at 56-57. Rule 407 simply referred to "measures," 
while the common law had specified "repairs," and Uniform Rule 51 had 
designated "precautionary or remedial measures" to be affected by the rule. 
!d. at 56-57. Second, Rule 407 broadened the scope of the earlier rule to 
include culpable conduct. !d. at 57. Earlier versions had solely referred to 
negligence. !d. Finally, Rule 407 included a second sentence, which identi-
fied various exceptions to the rule. !d. at 58. 
MclAIN, supra note 10, § 2.407.5(a); see also infra notes 41-43 and accompa-
nying text. 
McLAIN, supra note 10, § 2.407.5(a); see also infra Part II.A.3.a. 
MclAIN, supra note 10, § 2.407.5(a); see also infra Part II.A.3.b. 
MclAIN, supra note 10, § 2.407.5(a); see also infra Part II.A.3.c. 
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a. Low Probative Value 
Evidence that a defendant in a negligence action engaged in reme-
dial measures after an injury occurred has low probative value with 
respect to that defendant's negligence or culpability.44 A simple ex-
ample is that of a restaurant owner repairing a step leading up to the 
front door of his restaurant a few days after someone was injured on 
the step. 45 The mere fact that the owner made repairs after an acci-
dent is not probative of prior wrongdoing.46 
Taking remedial measures subsequent to an accident is unreliable 
evidence of liability because the measures may be unrelated to any 
negligence or culpability.47 For instance, the remedial measures 
taken by the defendant may be more than the standard of care re-
quired by law before the defendant knew of the accident. Properly 
assessing negligence requires an examination of" 'what the defendant 
knew or should have known prior to the accident, not what he knew as 
a result of the accident.' "48 Thus, changes made after an accident are 
not probative of how reasonable a defendant's conduct was prior to 
the accident.49 
b. Policy Reasons 
Admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures may have the 
negative effect of discouraging people from making corrective repairs 
to prevent future accidents.50 Banning subsequent conduct evidence 
best advances public safety and welfare interests.51 As one court 









McLAIN, supra note 10, § 2.407.5(a) (stating the reasons supporting Rule 5-
407, including low probative value). 
See Brooks v. Elders, Inc., 896 S.W.2d 744, 745 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). 
Another example of a subsequent remedial measure is a city repairing a 
depression in the sidewalk after a pedestrian allegedly fell into the hole and 
was injured. City of Miami Beach v. Wolfe, 83 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. 1955). 
The Wolfe court held that such evidence of post-accident repairs was inad-
missible to prove negligence. Id. at 776. 
Freeman, supra note 30, at 1183. 
!d. (quoting STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, FEDERAL RuLES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 
483 (6th ed. 1994)). Notably, "the wrongfulness ... of a person's conduct 
must be evaluated in the light of the risks apparent to him at the time, and 
not by looking backward 'with the wisdom born of the event.'" Aleshire v. 
State, 225 Md. 355, 367, 170 A.2d 758, 764 (1961) (quoting Cardozo, CJ., 
in Greene v. Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 177 N.E. 416, 417 (1931)). 
Hall v. Burns, 569 A.2d 10, 19 (Conn. 1990) (discussing the relevancy 
grounds for Rule 407). 
See McLAIN, supra note 10, § 2.407.5(a) (stating that "people should be en-
couraged to take subsequent remedial measures, even if the steps taken are 
more than the law requires of them"). 
Freeman, supra note 30, at 1185 (noting that the general public benefits if 
evidence of subsequent remedial measures is excluded because potential 
defendants will take extra safety measures to ensure production of safer 
and more reliable products). 
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and well-meaning defendant who guards against the recurrence of an 
accident he had no reason to anticipate, or who out of a considerate 
regard for the safety of others exercises a higher degree of care than 
the law requires."52 The rule excluding such evidence encourages 
people to take remedial measures, allowing them to do so without 
fearing the consequences of liability.53 
c. jury Confusion and Unfair Prejudice 
The final rationale behind Rule 407 is that evidence of subsequent 
remedial measures in a negligence action may confuse and mislead 
the jury and create unfair prejudice. 5 4 The jury may perceive the de-
fendant's remedial conduct as an admission of liability, or at least a 
concession that the defendant had earlier failed to meet the standard 
of due care.55 This is especially unfair in situations where the defen-
dant was exercising due care by law prior to taking subsequent reme-
dial measures. Thus, evidence that has minimal probative value may 
be given undue emphasis by a jury. 5 6 
B. Negligence and Products Liability Actions Compared 
In order to determine whether Rule 407 was intended to apply to 
products liability actions, one must understand the similarities and 
differences between actions based in negligence and actions based in 
strict products liability. 57 Similarities in the two support the theory 








Baron v. Reading Iron Co., 51 A. 979, 980 (Pa. 1902); see also Royals v. Ga. 
Peace Officer Standards and Training Council, 474 S.E.2d 220, 222 (Ga. 
App. 1996) (stating that allowing evidence of post-accident repairs to be 
admitted in negligence actions would conflict "with the public policy of 
encouraging safety through remedial action"). 
See Royals, 474 S.E.2d at 222. 
McLAIN, supra note 10, § 2.407.5(a). Presenting the jury with evidence of 
subsequent remedial measures may also serve as a distraction from the ulti-
mate issues. !d. 
!d. 
Id. For instance, the Florida Supreme Court has held that a trial court im-
properly admitted evidence that, subsequent to the plaintiff's injury in a 
railway car caused by her tripping over exposed pipes, the defendant cov-
ered the pipes with a shield. Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. Parks, 104 So. 
587, 588 (Fla. 1925). The court based its holding in part on inevitable jury 
confusion and prejudice. !d. at 589. The court stated that the jury likely 
drew the "natural inference in their minds unlearned in the law," that the 
defendant's subsequent repairs constituted an admission that the pipes 
were placed improperly and were unsafe. !d.; see also Tuer v. McDonald, 
34 7 Md. 507, 523 n.S, 701 A.2d ll 01, ll 09 n.S ( 1997). 
See infra Part II.B.1-2. 
See Werner v. Upjohn Co., Inc., 628 F.2d 848, 858 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding 
that the close similarity of negligence and strict liability supports its conclu-
sion that Rule 407 apply to products liability actions); see also Flaminio v. 
Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 467 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that the simi-
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larities, on the other hand, tends to support the theory that the rule 
does not pertain to products liability actions.59 
I. Negligence Actions 
Negligence is defined in Maryland as the failure to exercise "such 
care as the average prudent and careful [person] would exercise 
under similar circumstances."60 A prima facie case of negligence con-
sists of four basic elements: duty, breach, causation, and damages. 61 
The plaintiff must establish "(1) that the defendant was under a duty 
to protect the plaintiff from injury, (2) that the defendant breached 
that duty, (3) that the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss, and ( 4) 
that the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant's 
breach of the duty."62 Hence, negligence focuses on the defendant's 
conduct.63 
2. Products Liability Actions 
Under Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A, consumers 
may sue product manufacturers under a strict liability theory for inju-
ries resulting from the use of defective products.64 In order to recover 
under a products liability theory, the plaintiff must establish that: 
larities of the cost and risk factors in both negligence and products liability 
claims warrants application of the exclusionary rule to both actions). 
59. See generally Ault v. lnt'l Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1150 (Cal. 1974) 
(focusing on the difference in the elements between negligence and prod-
ucts liability as a reason for applying the exclusionary rule solely in negli-
gence cases). 
60. M.A. Long Co. v. State Accident Fund, 156 Md. 639, 650, 144 A. 775, 780 
(1929); see Heinz v. Bait. & Ohio R.R. Co., 113 Md. 582, 589, 77 A. 980, 983 
(1910); see also Adams v. NVR Homes, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 2d 675, 715 (D. 
Md. 2001) (applying Maryland law, the court held an engineer to the negli-
gence standard). 
61. Cramer v. Hous. Opportunities Comm'n of Montgomery County, 304 Md. 
705, 712, 501 A.2d 35, 39 (1985); Peroti v. Williams, 258 Md. 663, 669, 267 
A.2d 114, 118 (1970); Stickley v. Chisholm, 136 Md. App. 305, 314, 765 
A.2d 662, 668 (2001) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEE-
TON ON ToRTS§ 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984)); Hurt v. Chavis, 128 Md. App. 
626, 636, 739 A.2d 924, 930 (1999). 
62. Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., 335 Md. 58, 76, 642 A.2d 180, 188 (1994). 
63. See Rule 407: Subsequent Remedial Measures, 12 TouRO L. REv. 425, 428 
(1996). On the contrary, products liability actions focus on the product 
and whether it was defective. See id.; see also infra note 64 and accompany-
ing text; Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 469 (stating that the defendant's conduct is 
the focus of a negligence action, while the "dangerousness of the product 
regardless of the defendant's conduct" is the focus of strict liability). 
64. Restatement (Second) of Torts§ 402A (1965); see also Phipps v. Gen. Mo-
tors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 341-42, 363 A.2d 955, 957 (1976). Maryland 
adopted section 402A of the Restatement in 1976. !d. at 353, 363 A.2d at 
963. If Maryland chooses to adopt section 1 of the Restatement (Third) of 
Torts: Products Liability, the commercial seller or distributor of a defective 
product will still be liable under a strict products liability theory, although 
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( 1) The product was in a defective condition at the time that it 
left the possession or control of the seller, (2) that it was un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, (3) that the de-
Ject was a cause of the injuries, and ( 4) that the product was 
expected to and did reach the consumer without substantial 
change in its condition. 65 
A product has a "defective condition" when it suffers from a manu-
facturing defect, a design defect, or is accompanied by inadequate 
warnings.66 As in negligence actions, Maryland rejects hindsight lia-
bility, and measures liability at the time of product distribution.67 A 
product is not subject to strict liability simply because the product, 
viewed in hindsight with knowledge and information unavailable at 
the time of product distribution, was certain to be defective or danger-
ous.68 Imposition of hindsight liability in Maryland would result in 
forcing a manufacturer to "'becom[e] an insurer for every injury that 






the American Law Institute declined to use that term. See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF ToRTs: PRoDs. LIAB. § 1 cmt. a (1998). 
Nissan Motor Co. v. Nave, 129 Md. App. 90, 118, 740 A.2d 102, 117 (1998). 
The Restatement (Third) also categorizes the three classes of product de-
fects as (1) manufacturing defect, (2) design defect, and (3) inadequate 
instructions or warnings. REsTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 
(providing thorough definitions for the three types of defects). 
Nissan Motor Co., 129 Md. App. at 118, 740 A.2d at 117. A manufacturing 
defect exists when, at the time of sale, there was a flaw in the product that 
made it more dangerous than intended. !d. On the contrary, a design de-
fect is present when, although the product is manufactured exactly as in-
tended, the design itself is flawed. Phipps, 278 Md. at 344-45, 363 A.2d at 
959. A warning is deemed inadequate when, as a result of the deficient 
warning, thejroduct is unreasonably dangerous. Werner v. Upjohn Co., 
Inc., 628 F.2 848, 858 (4th Cir. 1980). More specifically, a product has 
inadequate warnings when the manufacturer fails to warn of "defects or 
propensities that make a product hazardous." Kennedy v. Mobay Corp., 84 
Md. App. 397, 412, 579 A.2d 1191, 1199 (1990). 
See supra text accompanying note 65. Hindsight liability refers to holding a 
manufacturer responsible for knowledge available at the time of trial. Ran-
dolph L. Burns, Comment, Subsequent Remedial Measures and Strict Products 
Liability: A New-Relevant-Answer to an Old Problem, 81 VA. L. REv. 1141, 
1161 (1995). This knowledge, unknown at the time of product distribu-
tion, is obtained through hindsight. /d. Maryland rejects this method of 
determining liability, and imposes liability based upon knowledge of the 
product at the time of distribution. Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 138 
Md. App. 136, 170, 770 A.2d 1072, 1092 (2001). 
Miles Labs., Inc. Cutter Labs. Div. v. Doe, 315 Md. 704, 735, 556 A.2d 1107, 
1122 (1989); see also Halliday, 138 Md. App. at 170, 770 A.2d at 1092 (opin-
ing that "with the benefit of hindsight, any accident could be foreseeable"). 
Halliday, 138 Md. App. at 170, 770 A.2d at 1092 (quoting Simpson v. Stan-
dard Container Co., 72 Md. App. 199, 206, 527 A.2d 1337, 1341 (1987)). 
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III. APPLICATION OF RULE 407 TO PRODUCTS LIABILI1Y 
ACTIONS 
Prior to the passage of the 1997 amendment, the absence of any 
reference to products liability in Federal Rule 407 caused courts to 
divide over the admissibility of evidence related to subsequent reme-
dial measures in those cases.70 Two contrary schools of thought ex-
isted on the matter. 71 Courts within the first school of thought held 
that unamended Rule 407 applied, so that evidence of subsequent re-
medial measures was inadmissible to prove culpable conduct in strict 
liability actions.72 On the contrary, courts supporting the other 
school of thought held that application of unamended Rule 407 was 
limited to negligence and culpable conduct, so that remedial conduct 
evidence was admissible in products liability actions.73 
A. Arguments Barring Admission 
Courts refusing to admit evidence of subsequent remedial measures 
in products liability actions conclude that a defendant's actions result-
ing in strict liability are "culpable conduct" under Rule 407.74 They 
argue that, because culpable conduct indicates "blameworthiness," 
and strict liability implies blameworthiness for placing the product 
into the stream of commerce, there should be no policy distinction 
between the two.75 Thus, although strict liability does not embrace 
blameworthiness in a negligence sense, proponents of applying Rule 
407 to products liability actions assert that because a manufacturer is 
deemed blameworthy for placing a defective product on the market, 
such blameworthiness embraces the culpable conduct referred to in 
Rule 407.76 
70. See supra note 6; see also Burns, supra note 67, at 1141-42 nn.5 & 8. The 
majority of courts applied the exclusionary rule to products liability actions. 
ld.; see also Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 468-69 (1984) (dis-
cussing the split in courts on the applicability of Rule 407 to strict liability 
cases). 
71. Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 62 Md. App. 101, 113, 488 A.2d 516, 521-
22 ( 1985); see also discussion supra Part IV.A-B. 
72. Troja, 62 Md. App. at 113, 488 A.2d at 522; see also discussion supra Part 
IV .A. 
73. Troja, 62 Md. App. at 113, 488 A.2d at 522; see also discussion supra Part 
IV.B. 
74. See, e.g., Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 856-57 (4th Cir. 1980) (stat-
ing that, while strict liability involves conduct that is "technically less blame-
worthy than simple negligence" and culpable conduct is more blameworthy 
than simple negligence, subsequent remedial measures should be inadmis-
sible to either one). 
75. Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 469 (opining that, under Wisconsin law, a "defen-
dant's blameworthiness" is applicable because it is compared with the 
"plaintiff's blameworthiness" in strict liability cases to determine compara-
tive negligence). 
76. See id. 
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Courts excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures also 
claim that the policy of encouraging repairs applies as equally to prod-
ucts liability cases as it does to negligence cases. 77 These courts argue 
that because accidents are low-probability events, a rule admitting evi-
dence of subsequent conduct may cause manufacturers involved in 
pending products liability suits to decide against taking possible safety 
precautions if "the cost of a possible loss in litigation outweighs the 
cost of taking the precaution."78 
Courts that bar evidence of subsequent repairs also question the 
probative value of such evidence. 79 Some argue that subsequent re-
pair evidence has even less probative value when offered in products 
liability cases.80 Manufacturers often change products for reasons un-
related to remedial measures, such as attempting to decrease produc-
tion costs or to increase efficiency.81 Remedial evidence possesses 
little probative value and may be outweighed by the risk of jury confu-
sion and unfair prejudice.82 The fear is that juries will conclude that a 
product change indicates an admission that the modification was 
made to remedy a defect,83 and that juries may "give great and deci-
sive weight to the perceived admission."84 
B. Arguments Favoring Admissibility 
Courts favoring admissibility of subsequent remedial conduct evi-
dence typically conclude that the policy rationale for the exclusionary 










Werner, 628 F.2d at 857. 
Flaminio, 733 F.2d at 469 (opining that, although seemingly immoral, eco-
nomic analysis may hinder a manufacturer from taking remedial measures 
if such measures may be admissible as evidence in future litigation). 
See McLAIN, supra note 10, § 2.407.5 (noting that, to some extent, Rule 5-
407 is merely a "specific application of the general principles enunciated in 
Rule 5-403"). Maryland Rule 5-403 states "[a]lthough relevant, evidence 
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the 
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence." Mo. R. Evm. 5-403. 
Ault v. Int'l Harvester Co., 528 P.2d 1148, 1156 (1974) (Clark, J., dissent-
ing). In his dissent, judge Clark argued that many product alterations have 
no relation to the change's remedial nature. ld. 
Ault, 528 P.2d at 1156. Judge Clark used the example of the automobile 
industry, where, on a annual basis, hundreds of changes are made in a new 
model. ld. He notes that it would be absurd to insinuate that each change 
was meant to remedy a defect. ld. 
See Freeman, supra note 30, at 1195. 
See id. 
Ault, 528 P.2d at 1156. 
Burns, supra note 67, at 1151. E.g., Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv., Inc., 
716 F.2d 1322, 1327 (lOth Cir. 1983) (stating that "it is unrealistic to think a 
tort feasor would risk innumerable additional lawsuits by foregoing neces-
sary design changes simply to avoid the possible use of those modifications 
as evidence by persons who have already been injured") (superceded by 
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such evidence does not hinder manufacturers from making repairs 
that could avert lawsuits and safeguard their public image.86 One 
court noted that no evidence exists to prove that manufacturers are 
even aware of the exclusionary rule or would modifY their behavior if 
they knew it existed.87 
Moreover, these courts assert that products liability cases do not re-
quire a showing of negligence or culpable conduct, and therefore the 
general exclusionary rule does not apply.88 They stress that negli-
gence and products liability are based upon two different theories: 
negligence liability stemming from the manufacturer's conduct and 
products liability focusing on the defectiveness of the product.89 
C. 1997 Amendment 
December 1, 1997 marked the official enactment of amended Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 407, which now explicitly excludes evidence of 
subsequent repairs in a strict products liability cause of action.9° Fed-
eral Rule 407 adopts the majority view and expressly excludes the use 
of subsequent remedial measures to prove a defect in a product or in 
a product's design.91 However, Rule 407 strictly limits inadmissibility 
to evidence of remedial measures taken by the defendant occurring 
after the "damages giving rise to the action."92 Therefore, evidence of 
actions taken by the defendant prior to the injury-producing event will 
not be excluded under Rule 407, even if they happened after the 
product was manufactured or designed.93 
Federal Rule of Evidence 407); Forma Scientific, Inc. v. Biosera, Inc., 960 
P.2d 108, 115-16 (Colo. 1998) (opining that "market forces generally oper-
ate to compel manufacturers to improve their products," not evidentiary 
rules); Ault, 528 P.2d at 1152 (stating that mass producers of goods will not 
likely forego improving a product at the risk of countless additional 
lawsuits). 
86. Burns, supra note 67, at 1151 (discussing the arguments in favor of admit-
ting evidence of subsequent remedial measures). 
87. Herndon, 716 F.2d at 1328 (stating "there is no evidence which shows that 
manufacturers even know about the evidentiary rule or change their behav-
ior because of it"). 
88. Ault, 528 P.2d at 1150. The court stated that the history of the rule and its 
purpose suggest that it should be applied only to negligence cases because 
the legislature could have selected "an expression less related to and consis-
tent with affirmative fault than 'culpable conduct.'" /d. at 1151; see also Bi-
osera, 960 P.2d at 115. 
89. Burns, supra note 67, at 1142-43. 
90. Daniel Ogburn, Comment, Subsequent Remedial Measures and the Application 
of California Law in a Diversity Action, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 615, 626 
(1999). 
91. FED. R. Evm. 407. 
92. FED. R. Evm. 407 advisory committee's note. 
93. /d.; see also Ogburn, supra note 90, at 628. 
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IV. RULE 407 IN MARYLAND 
A. Codification of the Maryland Rule 
Maryland initially followed the common law with regard to the ad-
missibility of evidence of subsequent remedial measures.94 In 1906, in 
Ziehn v. United Electric Light & Power Co. of Baltimore, 95 the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland first recognized and applied the United States 
Supreme Court's decision not to admit evidence of subsequent reme-
dial measures in Columbia.96 Maryland later began narrowing the ap-
plication of the general exclusionary rule, prohibiting the 
introduction of evidence of subsequent remedial measures "only 
when offered as an admission of liability or negligence on the part of 
the defendant but allowing it as independent, direct, or circumstantial 
evidence of negligence."97 Thus, Maryland common law created an 
exception to the basic exclusionary rule, admitting evidence of subse-
quent conduct to circumstantially prove failure to meet the applicable 
standard of care.98 
94. Tuer v. McDonald, 347 Md. 507, 516, 701 A.2d ll01, ll05 (1997). In Tuer, 
the estate of a patient who died after cardiac surgery brought a medical 
malpractice action against Mr. Tuer's cardiac surgeons. Id. at 508-09, 701 
A.2d at llOl. The plaintiff asserted that the physicians were negligent in 
failing to restart anticoagulant treatment after the postponement of the sur-
gery. Id. at 5ll, 701 A.2d at ll03. The plaintiff sought to introduce evi-
dence that after Mr. Tuer's death, the defendants changed hospital 
protocol so that the drug Heparin is now administered to patients prior to 
coronary artery bypass surgery. Id. at 510, 701 A.2d at ll02. The court 
held that, not only did the general rule exclude admission of such mea-
sures, but also the evidence would not be admitted under the impeachment 
and feasibility exceptions. Id. at 529, 531, 701 A.2d at 1112-13. In so hold-
ing, Judge Wilner provided an extensive discussion of the evolution of Ma-
ryland Rule 5-407. Id. at 516-23, 701 A.2d at llOS-09. 
95. 104 Md. 48, 64 A. 61 (1906). In Ziehn, a telephone lineman brought a 
negligence action against an electric utility company for injuries sustained 
when he came in contact with an uninsulated wire while repairing a tele-
phone line. /d. at 59-60, 64 A. at 62. The trial court refused to admit plain-
tiff's evidence that the utility company had moved the wires after the 
accident. Id. at 61, 64 A. at 63. Plaintiff appealed, primarily disputing the 
trial court's finding of contributory negligence as a matter of law, but also 
arguing that the electric company's subsequent remedial measures should 
have been admitted. /d. at 60, 61, 64 A. at 62, 63. The court held that 
"[t)he change of the location of the wires after the accident, could not 
affect the responsibility of the appellee, at the date of the accident." /d. at 
61, 64 A. at 63. 
96. /d.; see also supra note 24 (explaining the facts of the Columbia decision). 
97. Tuer, 347 Md. at 518, 701 A.2d at ll06 (citing Am. Paving & Contracting 
Co. v. Davis, 127 Md. 477, 96 A. 623 (1916), Blanco v.J.C. Penney, 251 Md. 
707, 710, 248 A.2d 645, 647 (1968), and Wilson v. Morris, 317 Md. 284, 296, 
563 A.2d 392, 397 (1989)). 
98. See id. at 520-21, 701 A.2d at ll07-08. 
2001] Maryland Rule of Evidence 5-407 151 
B. Troja v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co. 
In Troja v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co.,99 when a Maryland 
court was first faced with deciding which school of thought to sup-
port, 100 the court looked to the leading cases representing both sides 
of the argument. 101 The plaintiff in Troja brought negligence and 
products liability actions against the defendant, Black & Decker Man-
ufacturing Company, for injuries sustained while operating a Black & 
Decker radial arm saw. 102 In support of his claim that the product 
warning was inadequate, the plaintiff sought to admit evidence that 
Black & Decker later included a stronger warning on the model that it 
manufactured five years after his accident. 103 
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the trial court 
was correct in barring the plaintiff from introducing the evidence, be-
cause "in a strict liability case evidence of subsequent remedial mea-
sures is not admissible to prove culpable conduct."104 The court 
asserted that holding otherwise might deter defendants from taking 
remedial measures. 105 The court also stated that even if the evidence 
had been relevant, the potential of jury confusion would render it 
inadmissible.106 
C. The Maryland Rules Committee's Proposal Regarding Acceptance of the 
General Exclusionary Rule 
In 1988, the Court of Appeals of Maryland's Standing Committee 
on Rules of Practice and Procedure ("Rules Committee") received the 
task of proposing a comprehensive code of the rules of evidence.107 
An Evidence Subcommittee was appointed to examine the Federal 
Rules, rules of other states, and the current Maryland law.108 At that 
time, Maryland case law held that, while inadmissible as an admission 
of negligence or culpable conduct, evidence of prior remedial mea-
sures had relevance in regard to the standard of care issue.109 Specifi-
cally, the court stated that the evidence was admissible as 












62 Md. App. 101, 488 A.2d 516 (1985). 
See supra Part liLA-B. 
Troja, 62 Md. App. at 113-14, 488 A.2d at 522. 
ld. at 105, 488 A.2d at 517-18. 
Id. at 112, 488 A.2d at 521. 
ld. at 114, 488 A.2d at 522. 
Id. at 113-14, 488 A.2d at 522 (quoting Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 
857 (4th Cir. 1980)); see supra note 58 (discussing the Werner holding). 
Troja, 62 Md. App. at 113-14, 488 A.2d at 522. 
McLAIN, supra note 10, § 1.3(c). In 1977, the Court of Appeals of Maryland 
had considered proceeding with the evidence rules project, but decided to 
postpone the project. Id. s 1.3(b). 
Id. § 1.3(d)(2). 
Wilson, 317 Md. at 298, 563 A.2d at 398. 
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failed to achieve the applicable standard of care. 110 The Rules Com-
mittee criticized the case law stating that a "standard of care" excep-
tion created ambiguity and served to "swallow the Rule." 111 
Refusing to recognize the "standard of care" exception, the Rules 
Committee proposed a rule that adopted the substance of Federal 
Rule 407. 112 The proposed rule also incorporated a subsection explic-
itly referring to products liability actions. 113 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted the negligence and cul-
pable conduct portion of the rule, as well as the exceptions to the 
rule. First, the state rule was divided into two sections with separate 
subheadings. 114 Second, clarifying the time frame to which the rule 
pertains, the Rules Committee replaced the phrase "if taken previ-
ously" with the words "if in effect at the time of the event." 115 
D. The Maryland Rules Committee's Proposal Regarding Products Liability 
The Maryland Rules Committee's proposal to the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland indicated its belief that Rule 5-407 should be extended to 
incorporate products liability actions. 116 The proposal created a sepa-
rate subsection from the negligence exclusionary rule that addressed 









(b) Products Liability. In any action for injury or damage 
arising from an alleged defect in the design or manufacture 
of a product or.the failure to warn of a dangerous propensity 
of the product, if, after the product is placed into the stream 
of commerce, measures are taken which, if in effect when 
the product was placed into the stream of commerce, would 
!d. 
MARYLAND RuLES CoMMITTEE DRAFT § 5-407, 67 (July 1993) [hereinafter 
"CoMMITTEE DRAFT"]. Permitting the inclusion of remedial evidence to de-
fine the scope of a defendant's duty would ignore the rationale behind the 
exclusionary rule (low probative value, public policy, and probability of un-
fair prejudice). Id. 
See McLAIN, supra note 10, § 2.407.2. 
See infra text accompanying note ll8. 
See infra text accompanying note ll8. Section a's "In General" subheading 
referred to the basic exclusionary rule. See MD. R. Evm. 5-407(a). Section 
b's subheading "Admissibility for Other Purposes" pertained to the excep-
tions to the exclusionary rule. See MD. R. Evm. 5-407(b). 
McLAIN, supra note 10, § 2.407.3. See supra note 9 for the text of the rule. 
CoMMITTEE DRAFT, supra note ll1, at 66. The Rules Committee drafted a 
products liability subsection intended to clarify the rule's applicability to 
products liability actions. Id. Acknowledging the split in state and federal 
authority as to whether "culpable conduct" encompasses products liability 
actions, the Rules Committee stated that its proposal was consistent with 
Troja v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co., 62 Md. App. 101, cert. denied, 303 
Md. 4 71 ( 1985). !d. However, the Rules Committee left to case law other 
types of strict liability actions, including ones involving wild animals or dan-
gerous instrumentalities. Id. 
See id. at 65. 
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have made the injury or damage less likely to occur, evidence 
of the subsequent measures is not admissible to prove a de-
fect in the product or the warning. 118 
153 
The proposal, which came four years before the federal rule was 
amended,119 acknowledged the divided state and federal authority as 
to whether the rule should apply to products liability.120 However, the 
Rules Committee concluded that the rule should explicitly apply to 
products liability actions, to be consistent with the holding in Troja. 121 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland refused to adopt the subsection 
explicitly applying to products liability actions, leaving further devel-
opment to case law. 
V. PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO RULE 5-407 
An amendment to Rule 5-407 is necessary in order to clarify the 
rule's application to products liability actions. The Troja court's indi-
cation that the rule is applicable to products liability actions122 is sim-
ply not enough. An amendment would resolve remaining questions 
regarding the specifics of applying the exclusionary rule to products 
liability actions. 
A. The Language of the Amendment 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland should amend Maryland Rule 5-
407 to add a subsection (b), so that the rule reads: 
Products Liability. Where injury or damage results from an 
alleged product design or manufacture defect or a need for 
a warning or instruction, evidence that, after the product is 
placed into the stream of commerce, measures are taken 
which, if taken previously, would have made the injury or 
damage less likely to occur is not admissible to prove a defect 
in the product or the need for a warning or instruction. 123 
The suggested amendment clearly specifies that the exclusionary 
rule applies to any action claiming one of the three possible defective 
conditions. 
118. /d. 
119. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
120. CoMMITrEE DRAIT, supra note 111, at 66. 
12L /d.; see supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text. 
122. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text. 
123. The substance of this proposed rule does not differ from that proposed by 
the Rules Committee. See supra text accompanying note 118. Changes are 
made solely for clarity purposes. 
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B. Defining ''Event" in a Products Liability Action 
The proposed amendment also expressly identifies the "event" as 
placing the product into the stream of commerce.124 Traditionally, 
the exclusionary rule has conferred a privilege to remedial measures 
taken after an accident or injury. 125 Because Maryland applies Rule 5-
407 to products liability cases, and the traditional rule did not, a deter-
mination must be made as to which event the rule applies. 
There is only one possible relevant event in a negligence action: the 
injury to a person.126 If a person has been negligent and takes action 
before the accident occurs to remedy this negligence, the person pre-
sumably has thwarted the occurrence of a negligent act. 127 Thus, the 
issue of the event in a negligence action is irrelevant.128 
However, in a products liability action, the question arises as to 
whether the event is the injury to a person or the placing of the prod-
uct into the stream of commerce. 129 The problem with identifYing 
"event" is clear when applying it to the previous seatbelt hypotheti-
cal. 130 Suppose Manufacturer A begins selling the seat belt to car 
manufacturers in January 2001. In February 2001, Consumer B 
purchases a car with this particular seat belt. Later that same month, 
Manufacturer A redesigns the seat belt. Then, in March 2001, Con-
sumer B is injured in a car accident and sues Manufacturer A, claim-
ing the seat belt was defective. 
If Maryland were to rely on the current version of Rule 5-407, there 
would be confusion as to whether the measures are admissible. Manu-
facturer A would argue evidence of his subsequent conduct is inadmis-
sible, as he made the changes after the event of placing the seat belt 
into the stream of commerce. Consumer B would argue that the evi-
124. See CoMMitTEE DRAFT, supra note 111, at 66. The Reporter's Note indicates 
that "[s]ection (b) is intended to give guidance as to the 'time line,' since 
in products cases the 'subsequent' measures may take place before the in-
jury does." !d. 
125. Freeman, supra note 30, at 1196. Freeman notes that not only did Professor 
Wigmore construe both sections of the rule as referring to "'past or future 
harm' and 'injury,'" the ALI Model Code similarly concluded that "the tak-
ing of a precaution by a person to prevent the repetition of a previous harm 
or the occurrence of a similar harm" is privileged. !d. 
126. Eric L. Vinson, Note, Applying Federal Rule of Evidence 407 in Strict Liability: A 
Discussion of Changes to the Rule, 16 REv. Lrnc. 773, 777 (1997). 
127. !d. For example, assume that A, a Maryland restaurant owner, negligently 
maintains the stairs leading up to his restaurant. Assume that B, a patron, 
is injured on the steps. Mter B's accident, A takes measures to repair the 
steps. Evidence of such measures would be inadmissible under Rule 5-407. 
However, if A had repaired the stairs befare B's injury, A never would have 
faced a lawsuit because B would have not been injured due to A's negli-
gence. Thus, in negligence actions, any inquiry as to the definition of 
"event" in Rule 5-407 is mooted. See id. 
128. !d. 
129. !d. 
130. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2. 
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dence is admissible, because the changes were made before the event of 
injury. Thus, maintaining the current rule is not a favorable option 
because the confusion surrounding the definition of "event" will 
remain. 
In order to recover under a products liability theory, one of the 
elements that a plaintiff must prove is that the product was defective 
"at the time that it left the possession or control of the seller."131 Be-
cause Maryland does not employ hindsight liability,132 the fact finder 
is limited to product knowledge and information accessible to the 
manufacturer at the time of distribution.133 However, if the jury hears 
evidence of post-distribution remedial measures, it may inappropri-
ately assume that the manufacturer had knowledge of a defect prior to 
the accident. Although such knowledge is irrelevant under Mary-
land's products liability law, a jury will likely "have difficulty limiting 
the use of the evidence to only that part of the defectiveness formula 
of which it is probative."134 Thus, allowing in evidence of remedial 
measures taken post-distribution may disturb Maryland's products lia-
bility scheme, as manufacturers may be held liable for product knowl-
edge available only through hindsight. 135 
Furthermore, to best serve the purposes of the rule, the "event" in 
question should refer to placing the product into the stream of com-
merce.136 First, the probative value of evidence of conduct taken after 
the sale is no more probative than evidence of measures taken after 
the plaintiff's accident.137 Evidence of subsequent remedial measures 
taken after either event will serve only to mislead, unduly prejudice, 
and confuse the jury. Additionally, defining "event" as placing the 
product into the stream of commerce assists "the policy goal of en-
couraging ... manufacturers to" place the safest possible products on 
the market. 138 Defining event as placing the product into the stream 
of commerce will allow manufacturers to engage in an aggressive pur-
131. Phipps v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 Md. 337, 344, 363 A.2d 955, 958 (1976); 
see also supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing necessary elements 
to prove in order to recover in a products liability action). 
132. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (discussing hindsight liability). 
133. Burns, supra note 67, at 1178 (emphasizing that evidence subsequent to 
distribution is irrelevant in non-hindsightjurisdictions). 
134. Id. 
135. See id. (asserting that "[a]llowing the use of subsequent repairs to prove 
defect when the strict liability scheme designates the time of distribution as 
the point at which liability attaches effectively holds the manufacturer re-
sponsible for product knowledge outside the scope of the state's law"). 
136. See infra notes 137-39 and accompanying text. 
137. See Vinson, supra note 126, at 787 (stating "[t]he notion that a remedial 
measure, such as a warning, taken the day before a plaintiffs accident is 
more probative than a remedial measure taken the day after is not sup-
ported by logic or equity concerns"). 
138. !d. 
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suit to produce the safest product without fear of punishment by a 
rule of evidence. 139 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Maryland Rule 5-407 should be amended to explicitly apply to prod-
ucts liability actions. An amendment would be consistent with the ra-
tionale behind Rule 5-407, including excluding evidence that lacks 
probative value, 140 preserving the policy of encouraging people to 
make repairs, 141 and preventing the jury from being misled and con-
fused.142 The current rule is insufficient to handle all of the issues 
that may arise when a products liability plaintiff seeks to admit evi-
dence of the defendant's subsequent conduct. 143 An amendment will 
remove any lingering doubt in Maryland regarding admissibility of 
subsequent remedial measures in products liability actions. Moreover, 
an amendment will clarify the definition of "event," so as to resolve 
any questions regarding the time frame to which the rule applies.144 
Failure to do so may erroneously expand the scope of Maryland's 
products liability scheme. 145 
Jaime A. Walker 
139. I d. at 788 (noting that defining event as the time of sale allows manufactur-
ers to improve product safety "without fear of providing ammunition to a 
potential plaintiffs case"). 
140. See supra Part II.A.3.a. 
141. See supra Part II.A.3.b. 
142. See supra Part II.A.3.c. 
143. See supra Part V.B. 
144. See supra Part V.B. 
145. See supra Part V.B. 
